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Abstract Engagement is important to the success of
applications, systems and artefacts as diverse as robotics,
pedagogy, games, interactive installations, and virtual
reality applications. Yet engagement has proved to be
remarkably difficult to define as it can take many forms, so
many that it is difficult to isolate what these different
instantiations have in common. Instead of pursuing an
empirical perspective, the human side of engagement,
namely, involvement is considered from a broadly
Heideggerian perspective. As Heidegger has a deserved
reputation for philosophical obscurity, all of the concepts
adopted from his work are mapped onto the more familiar
languages and vocabularies of psychology, human–
computer interaction and cognitive science. It is argued
that technology is engaging and our response to it is to be
involved (with it). This resulting involvement–engagement
dyad is thus an explicitly holistic account recognising roles
for affordance, purpose, identity, affect and embodiment.
Keywords Involvement ! Engagement ! Affordance !
Affect ! Identity ! Heidegger
1 Introduction
Creating digital technologies which people find engaging is
clearly an important design goal (e.g. Grudin and Pruitt
2002; Rozendaal et al. 2007 among many others) but is one
which presents us with a number of problems not least of
which is that engagement itself has not been clearly
defined. We neither understand what it is about technology
which people find engaging nor the details of experience of
engagement in any generally applicable form. While this
paper does not intend offering a solution to this design
problem, it does seek to lay bare the structure or anatomy
of engagement from theoretical perspectives. Under-
standing what is meant to be engagement is surprisingly
difficult despite the ubiquity of its use. In surveying the
literature, engagement appears in a variety of different
guises, in an array of contexts and is associated with many
different kinds of technology. Indeed Lehmann et al. (2012)
prefer to speak of ‘‘models of engagement’’ and pattern of
engagement rather than a single overarching model.
Engagement is also often prefixed with a wide range of
modifiers, for example, pedagogues speak of the impor-
tance of creating educational applications and systems
which are cognitively engaging (e.g. Virvou et al. 2005;
Gunter et al. 2008) while artists and craftspeople endeavour
to create interactive jewellery which is emotionally
engaging (e.g. White and Steel 2006). In contrast, artistic
installations have been designed to present a sense of ludic
engagement (e.g. Hook et al. 2003; Hull and Reid 2003;
Gaver et al. 2004; Gaver et al. 2005; Hornecker and Sifter
2006; Morrison et al. 2007).
The role of the body has been considered in corporeal
engagement (e.g. Turner 2008; Bryan-Kinn 2010; Micro-
soft Kinect 2010), while aesthetic engagement has been
considered (e.g. O’Brien and Toms 2008; Sutcliffe 2010;
Xenakis and Arnellos 2012) as has feminist engagement
(e.g. Wajcman 2009). Given this diversity, it is difficult to
see a common thread connecting cognition, emotion, the
ludic, the corporeal, aesthetics, and feminism—apart from
their being described as different forms of engagement.
Engagement is, of course, a ‘‘defining’’ quality of suc-
cessful computer games (e.g. Dickey 2005; Schuurink et al.
2008; Febretti and Garzotto 2009; McGonigal 2011; Boyle
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et al. 2012) and has also been identified as a key aspect of
human–robot interaction (e.g. Sidner et al. 2005; Rich et al.
2010). Studies of social robotic system such as Aibo (e.g.
Hsu et al. 2007), Furby (e.g. Buechley et al. 2008), Keepon
(Kozima et al. 2009), and even the very simple interactive
‘‘pets’’ such as tamagotchi (e.g. Turkle 2007) have all
revealed the importance of engagement to the success of
these technologies.
Engagement is also important in the experience of
telepresence (e.g. Lessiter et al. 2001; Slater 2003 among
many others). Telepresence, the experience of being
somewhere by way of virtual reality technology, is regar-
ded by many as comprising two distinct factors, namely
spatial presence and engagement (Slater 2003). Similarly,
social presence (the sense of being with others) is defined
by Biocca (2001) as comprising co-presence, psychological
involvement and behavioural engagement.
Finally, Shneiderman (2004) tells us that engaging user
interfaces involve ‘‘funfeatures’’ which in turn are ‘‘allur-
ing’’, ‘‘compelling’’, ‘‘appealing’’ and ‘‘satisfying’’.
Schneiderman sees designing for engagement as being
distraction-free fun while still allowing us to get on with
our work!
2 Definitions of engagement
As we have seen, engagement is widely cited in the
human–computer interaction (HCI) literature, but in prac-
tice, it is rarely defined. We now consider the few extant
definitions beginning with Edmonds and his colleagues
who write from the perspective of the public’s engagement
with visual art as found in museums and galleries. He
describes creative engagement as having three elements,
namely attractors, sustainers and relaters (Edmonds et al.
2006). Attractors encourage the audience to take note of
the technology in the first place, their power of attraction is,
‘‘a question of appropriate differentiation from the context,
not an intrinsic property of the work itself’’. The next
category is the sustainers who have the power to hold an
audience. These are conceived as the, ‘‘behavioural pat-
terns of the work […] and a combination of easy-to-grasp
patterns and slightly obscure ones is the basis of the way
forward’’. Finally, there are relaters who help create a
continuing relationship with the audience but, at the time of
publication, these are less well defined.
Jacucci and his colleagues (Jacucci et al. 2010) have
also considered engagement with public displays. While
not explicitly defining engagement, we have a clue as to
their thinking as they measure it with respect to flow,
presence and what they describe as ‘‘intrinsic motiva-
tion’’. Thus, they regard engagement as comprising
absorption (flow), a sense of being present (presence),
and providing an intrinsic goal (flow—again and
motivation).
Other kinds of definitions are found in the pedagogic
literature, for example, Jones (1998) defines engagement as
a combination of the knowledge, interest and stimuli that
promote initial interest and continued use of an environ-
ment. While Szafir and Mutlu (2012) (among many others)
often directly equate attention and engagement: an engaged
student being one who is paying attention (and vice versa),
but this is rather limited.
Finally, Mayes and Cotton (2001) and McGonigal
(2011) have sought to describe why computer games are so
appealing and engaging. Mayes and Cotton identify the key
aspects as fun, being involving and being motivating while
McGonigal writes of goals, rules, feedback and voluntary
participation. For McGonigal, a goal provides players with
a sense of purpose; the rules place limitations on how
players can achieve the goal requiring the players to
explore other possibilities. The feedback system tells
players how close they are to achieving the goal. Finally,
voluntary participation establishes common ground
between players.
What emerges from this review is that engagement has
been described in terms of both technological properties
and psychological phenomena. From the perspective of
technology, it has also been described in terms of, feed-
back, goals, ‘‘stimuli’’, ‘‘attractors’’, ‘‘sustainers’’ and
‘‘relaters’’ while from the psychological: flow, presence,
(intrinsic) motivation, absorption, knowledge, interest,
attention, (following) rules and participation.
Despite, or perhaps because of, this diversity, it can
come as little surprise that there is no agreed account of
engagement, a view echoed by Brockmyer et al. (2009).
2.1 Engaging technology, involving use
The approach to defining engagement adopted in this paper
is to recognise that it is a dyadic relationship with tech-
nology, and the construct ‘‘involvement–engagement’’ is
proposed rather than ‘‘engagement’’ per se. From this
premise, engagement then becomes a property of the
technology to which we (as users) respond by becoming
involved with it. As for the treatment of the involvement,
half of involvement–engagement, Heidegger’s ontological
writings are drawn upon to structure and guide this dis-
cussion. This is, then, necessarily an explicitly holistic
approach to this problem of definition.
Having surveyed examples of engagement, we now turn
to a discussion of the nature of involvement. Etymologi-
cally, involvement is from the Latin involvere, meaning ‘‘to
be rolled up in’’, while in Middle English, it means ‘‘to
enfold’’ or ‘‘to entangle’’, thus to be involved with tech-
nology is to be rolled up in it or enfolded by it. To explore
34 AI & Soc (2014) 29:33–43
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the nature of this enfolding, we step back from the heter-
ogeneity of the empirical to adopt a (broadly) ontological
perspective.
2.2 Ontology and human–computer interaction
Ontology refers to the study of the nature of being or of
existence, and a number of ontological arguments have
already appeared within the human–computer interaction
literature based primarily on the work of Martin Heidegger.
These arguments have been offered as counter points and
challenges to the many prevailing positivist, constructionist
and even enlightenment accounts of human–computer
interaction (HCI).
Winograd and Flores (1986) were the first to bring
Heidegger’s work to the attention to the HCI community
with a description of such concepts as ‘‘readiness-to-hand’’
(Zuhandenheit) and of ‘‘throwness’’ (Geworfenheit) in their
Computers and Cognition. Though widely cited, these
descriptions are actually really very brief.
In contrast, Coyne has proposed a very comprehensive
postmodern, radical reformulation of human–computer
interaction in a number of books and related papers (e.g.
Coyne 1995, 1998, 1999, 2003). While this work is a
model of the scholarly examination of human–computer
interaction, it also serves to underline the gulf between
theory and practice in HCI. Coyne systematically chal-
lenges many of the key, and largely under-examined,
concepts in HCI including ‘‘identity, proximity, commu-
nity, embodiment, pattern, [and] representation’’ (p. 338).
He writes that our interest should shift from ‘‘the abstract,
technological concern to the everyday’’ and that we should
focus on ‘‘care, being-with, corporality, praxis, disclosure
and the not-yet’’ (ibid).
Dourish’s (2001) well received Where the Action Is has
also developed and applied the work of Heidegger and
Merleau-Ponty to tangible computing and computer sup-
ported cooperative working. Where the Action Is offers
perhaps the best theoretically rich and empirically strong
account of HCI to appear since Card et al. (1983). Dourish
uses philosophical concepts to provide what he describes as
the ‘‘foundations for embodied interaction’’ which he
argues is the future of HCI.
Although not strictly a contributor to HCI, Dreyfus’
role as the principal commentator on Heidegger, and a
significant philosopher in his own right, cannot be
ignored. He has contributed more than anyone else to our
understanding of Heidegger particularly from the per-
spectives of cognitive science and artificial intelligence—
the latter discipline being recognised as being closely
linked to HCI (cf. Winograd 2006). Dreyfus has been
highly critical of the use of classical cognitive approaches
to these disciplines (Dreyfus 1991, 1996, 2002) and is
perhaps best known for his commentaries on Heidegger
and Merleau-Ponty.
Overall, ontological accounts of our use of digital
technology have existed for more than 25 years, and while
they are yet to become mainstream, their vocabulary has
gained some currency.
Having established the provenance of the ontological in
HCI, the next section offers on initial sketch of how He-
idegger’s ontology might be used to construct an account
of involvement.
3 The nature of involvement
Heidegger’s (1927/1962) major work—Being and Time is
primarily concerned with the question of being. This is the
unanswered question which Descartes posed in his famous
dictum, ‘‘I think therefore I am’’. Having established that
all he could be certain of was that he was thinking, Des-
cartes fails to discuss the consequence, namely, that he was
(the ‘‘I am’’ in his question). Heidegger’s reply to this
question is to tell us that we-are-in-the-world, not separate
from it, not separable from it (hence the use of hyphens)
and to-be-in-the-world is to be involved with it and all it
comprises by definition. This, then, is a holistic account as
it necessarily abandons any subject–object dualism.
By addressing the nature of being from this perspective,
Heidegger shifts the focus of attention from the theoretical
to the practical; from the reflective to the phenomenolog-
ical (cf. Coyne’s observations above); from abstract
knowledge to the practical and everyday. Heidegger argues
that Western thought, which necessarily includes HCI,
places greater value on the abstract and theoretical while
our real focus should be on the mundane, everyday and
concrete. So, despite the fact that the current discussion is
philosophical and specifically, ontological in character, it is
squarely based in the real, everyday world experiences of
people using digital technology.
So having established that we are in-the-world, what of
involvement? In short, to-be-in-the-world is to be involved:
They are effectively synonyms. We are involved with the
world in the sense that we cannot escape it (except through
powerful drugs or bouts of psychosis).
More specifically, the degree of involvement, however,
does vary depending upon how engaging (and available)
the digital technology is. Indeed, this entire description of
involvement–engagement hinges on the nature of this
availability. For Heidegger, all human activity is located in
a ‘‘web of significance’’, or ‘‘context of equipment’’ com-
prising interrelated items of technology which are per-
ceived as being useful in order to complete tasks. From this
reading, involvement with technology is an inevitable,
unavoidable consequence being-in-the-world. Thus, most
AI & Soc (2014) 29:33–43 35
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of us have not adopted a theoretical stance with respect to
technology because we are (already) involved with it.
So, being-in-the-world, how do we encounter technol-
ogy? Dreyfus and Wrathall (2005, p. 4) tell us, ‘‘we first
encounter worldly things as available. Something is
available when (1) it is defined in terms of its place in a
context of equipment, typical activities in which it is used,
and typical purposes and goals for which it is used, and (2)
it lends itself to such use readily and easily without need
for reflection. The core case of availability is an item of
equipment that we know how to use and that transparently
lends itself to use’’.
Having encountered technology as available we also
recognise that it can be used in-order-to [do things].
Heidegger tells us that, ‘‘Equipment is essentially
something in-order-to’’ and in-order-to is equivalent to an
affordance (Gibson 1986) or a cluster of affordances
(Turner 2005). Thus, when we make use of, or engage with
an in-order-to, it is equivalent to a engaging with a task.
Tasks, in turn, need to be considered against the back-
ground of purpose and reason. In answering the question,
‘‘why we are using an item of technology?’’, Heidegger
replies it is for-the-sake-of-something or other. Thus,
despite the occasional odd turn of phrase, Heidegger tells
us that we encounter technology as available, that is,
offering possibilities for use (in-order-to’s) which we
exploit for-the-sake-of the tasks we need to complete.
All of this activity is set against a background of affect
(Befindlichkeit—more of which later) which orients us
(towards) and provides the means by which we are
involved with the technology itself. Ratcliffe (2002, p. 287)
notes that, ‘‘Emotions, and more specifically moods, are
philosophically central for Heidegger. They are not merely
‘‘subjective’’ or ‘‘psychic’’ phenomena but an irreducible
pre-theoretical background, relative to which the world and
the manner in which we are situated within it is disclosed
or rendered intelligible’’. Thus, it is affect which allows us
to make sense of what we are doing.
However, our use of technology (or any other tool) has
further consequences as it also serves to define who we are.
Heidegger regarded the ‘‘self’’ as being indeterminate and
contingent, describing human beings as Dasein.1 The self is
grounded in what we do and in the tools we use, as these
change so does our identity—from husband, to teacher, to
cricket fan, to colleague. Valera uses the term ‘‘micro-
identity’’ to capture these shifts nicely. These relationships
are, of course, reflexive. A cricket bat is that tool used by a
cricketer, and a cricketer is someone (Dasein) who uses a
cricket bat.
We may conclude that Heidegger and subsequent neo-
Heideggerian thought has provided a sufficiently rich
vocabulary with which to describe the nature of involve-
ment–engagement.
Involvement–engagement is thus defined as a dyadic
relationship pivoting or turning on the notion or concept of
availability. We are involved in the world, and all it
comprises depending upon the degree to which we
encounter it as engaging. This involvement is evidenced by
a variety of psychological and bodily states including
motivation, ‘‘flow’’, absorption, immersion and so forth.
From Heidegger’s perspective, involvement is a primordial
state (that is, it cannot be reduced to simpler or component
states) and it is from our involvement that motivation,
immersion and these other psychological states flow.
Engagement, in contrast, is the meshwork of opportunities
realised in technology which are exploited by (human)
involvement. These opportunities (though ‘‘affordance’’
does seem a more natural term) have been variously clas-
sified as ‘‘attractors’’, or as ‘‘sustainer’’, or as goals and so
forth. The opportunities offered by technology for
engagement are not and cannot be treated as design fea-
tures because design features are only experienced as
present-at-hand.2
Finally, involvement–engagement should not be thought
of as a series of states, one triggering another, for example,
an affective ‘‘orientation’’ followed by detecting in-order-
to’s followed by the activation of the chain of for-the-sake-
of-which’s but, in keeping with Heidegger’s radical holism,
should be regarded as a network or meshwork of responses
to the affordances offered.
Having offered this initial sketch of involvement–
engagement, we now consider the structure of involvement
in more detail beginning with the nature of in-order-to.
4 The structure of involvement
This section develops the initial sketch outlined above.
1 Dasein is traditonally left untranslated and is understood to mean
‘‘exist’’ and ‘‘there be’’.
2 Availability is not the only way we experience technology.
Technology can also be experienced as unavailable. Technology is
experienced as being unavailable when it breaks down, for example, I
experience the word processing software I am using to write this as
available as I compose these words but occasionally the software
misbehaves. The formatting of the text sometimes behaves in
unexpected and undesirable ways. When this happens, the technology
becomes ‘‘visible’’, that is, the task of writing is relegated to the
background and the misbehaving software occupies the foreground.
After dealing with the formatting problem, the software disappears
into the background and cease to be unavailable.
The third way in which we encounter technology is a little remote,
Heidegger describes it as present-at-hand. We encounter technology
(and so forth) as present-at-hand when we are engaged in ‘‘detached
standing before’’ (Dreyfus 1991) or when we engage in theoretical
reflection or during observation and experimentation.
36 AI & Soc (2014) 29:33–43
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4.1 In-order-to
Our use of digital technology is both purposive and con-
cernful. That is, we use technology of all kinds to achieve
our goals and we do so in a manner which is neither
detached nor disinterested: we are involved. The pragmatic
aspects of this use (i.e. utility and usability) have attracted
the attention of human–computer interaction research and
development for decades. In contrast, the concernful
aspects have received relatively little attention. To be
concernful is to recognise the inter-connectedness of
activities and use of tools in the broader context of other
people, other technologies and other contexts. This, of
course, is the substance of ‘‘involvement’’, and this
involvement with technology enables us to encounter it as
available or ready-to-hand. To be ready-to-hand means that
we encounter/experience technology as being proximal or
handy and as being available for immediate use or action.
More specifically, availability (readiness-to-hand etc.)
means that the technology is within easy reach, that is, it is
handy. This does not mean within n metres of me but more
how familiar it is to me. So, for example, on my desk is my
laptop and my mobile phone, next door is the another
phone connected to a landline, and across the road and to
the right is a post box. All provide means of communica-
tion (email, voice and text, voice and letter, respectively),
but it is to email which I would more usually turn as it is
handier (available, proximal etc.). Email reflects how I
prefer to communicate with people (who are beyond the
reach of my voice), I am very familiar with its operation
and I have appropriated it to suit how I work. Email is a
ready-to-hand form of communication—in my experience.
However, readiness-to-hand and availability are experien-
tial terms, and as experiences, they cannot be reduced to a
set of features which the technology might have. Indeed, if
anything, to experience technology as being ready-to-hand
is to have it ‘‘disappear’’ when in use (e.g. Bødker 1991;
Csikszentmihalyi 1990, 1992; Dey et al. 2001 among many
others).
Each item of equipment is available for a specific
task—in-order-to sit on, in-order-to eat with, in-order-to
write with, in-order-to sew with, in-order-to communicate
and so on—reflecting their affordances. While this all
appears rather functional, tools for enjoying ourselves and
for having fun are no different as these too are encoun-
tered as ready-to-hand and in-order-to. However, it is not
meaningful to describe a tool or an in-order-to in isola-
tion. All tools (and all in-order-to’s) exist with respect to
each other as equipment. In adopting this perspective,
Heidegger moves us away from thinking in terms of the
discrete properties of things, to how we encounter these
things as, to use Harman’s term, ‘‘tool-beings’’ (Harman
2002).
As already noted, a more familiar term for in-order-to is
‘‘affordance’’. Gibson (1986) introduced the term ‘‘affor-
dance’’ to denote the relation between the organism and its
environment. ‘‘The affordances of the environment are
what it offers the animal, what it provides or furnishes,
either for good or ill’’. An affordance, once detected, is
meaningful and has value for the animal. Gibson originally
conceived of affordances as being objective, that is, an
affordance thus exists, whether it is perceived or used or
not, but he revised this, writing, ‘‘An affordance cuts across
the dichotomy of subjective–objective and helps us to
understand its inadequacy. It is equally a fact of the envi-
ronment and a fact of behaviour. It is both physical and
psychical, yet neither. An affordance points both ways, to
the environment and to the observer’’ (ibid). This discus-
sion leads quite naturally to a discussion of where of
involvement occurs. The ‘‘where’’ of involvement–
engagement is also known as its context, characterised as
‘‘availability for action’’ (Dourish 2004), while Merleau-
Ponty (1945/1962) describes as lived space, and Spinosa
et al. (2001) calls it disclosive space. Directly equating a
complex of activity or behaviour with its own context is not
without precedence as it is also central to activity theory
(e.g. Engestro¨m 1987; Bødker 1991). Within activity
theory, an activity is the fundamental unit of analysis and
as such comprises the context of that activity.
4.2 For the sake-of-which
As we discussed earlier, Heidegger recognizes that tools, in
addition to being in-order-to, are also associated with a
broader set of purposes which he calls ‘‘for-the-sake-
of-which’’. This underlines the fundamental interconnec-
tedness of the tools as equipment which make up the world.
He writes, making reference to his favourite example,
hammering …, as follows:
With hammering, there is an involvement in making
something fast; with making something fast, there is
an involvement in protection against bad weather;
and this protection ‘‘is’’ for the sake of providing
shelter
We use a hammer to make something fast (secure) for
the sake of making it weather-proof, for the sake of pro-
tecting one’s home, for the sake of the health and happiness
of one’s family for the sake of… and so on. The nature of
these involvements only being revealed within the broader
context.
An involvement is itself discovered only on the basis
of the prior discovery of an involvement-whole.
This meshwork of involvements is not a simple series of
dependencies but is quite heterogeneous. So, for example,
AI & Soc (2014) 29:33–43 37
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(switching from hammering to academic writing) I am
currently using my iMac (a with-which), in my office (an
in-which), in order to complete this paper (dropping a
‘level’ to an in-order-to), which is intended to demonstrate
the usefulness of Heidegger’s ontology to understanding
the involvement–engagement dyad (a towards-this), for the
sake of meeting my publication targets (a for-the-sake-of-
which). The final involvement here, the for-the-sake-of-
which, is crucial, because according to Heidegger, all
involvements rely a ‘‘link’’ of this type. Thus, every for-
the-sake-of-which provides the base structure of all (sub-
sequent and dependent) involvements and offers a possible
way for Dasein to be, to be an academic, to be a carpenter,
a parent, or whatever (Wheeler 2011). Thus, I research (fix
roofs, look after my family or whatever), if and only if, I
understand myself as a researcher (husband, odd-job man),
and I engage in research acts for-the-sake-of my being a
researcher. If this sounds a little circular and self-referen-
tial, unlike the more structured treatments of task hierar-
chies (e.g. Annett 2004), then this is very much a
consequence of Heidegger’s holistic thinking.
So far we have mapped out the nature of our involve-
ment with technology in terms of identifying the use to
which we can put technology and completing the tasks we
face. However, this could equally be an account of our
interaction with technology rather than our involvement–
engagement with it. The two are distinguished by the role
of affect in involvement–engagement to which we now
turn.
4.3 Affect, mood and affectedness
From an everyday perspective, we are involved with
technology because we find it rewarding, fun, enjoyable,
pleasurable and correspondingly we do not involve our-
selves with technology when it makes us nervous and
anxious (the terror ‘‘enjoyed’’ on a fairground ride is based
on the recognition that the ride is safe). Thus, the final
aspect of Heidegger’s ontology we draw upon is his
treatment of affect. Characteristically, Heidegger does not
discuss affect or emotion directly, instead he uses the terms
Befindlichkeit and Stimmung. Befindlichkeit has been var-
iously translated as ‘‘how one finds oneself’’, ‘‘state-of-
mind’’ or ‘‘situatedness’’. It is what we are enquiring about
when we ask someone, ‘‘how are you?’’ in everyday
speech. Dreyfus (1991) translates it as affectedness though
Ratcliffe (2002) prefers ‘‘attunement’’.
Stimmung is usually translated as ‘‘mood’’—as under-
stood as an enduring disposition rather than ephemeral
‘‘being in a mood’’. Together, they allow us to make sense
of the world. Dasein ‘‘belongs’’ to a world which is first
disclosed by its feelings (mood) for and about it.
Gendlin (2006) tells us that Befindlichkeit differs from
the usual treatment of affect. Whereas affect and feeling are
typically thought of as something within us, Heidegger’s
concept refers to something both inward and outward
making them fundamentally situated. Secondly, we may not
be conscious of our mood, nevertheless there is an under-
standing of our living in that mood. Thus, we encounter
situations in that mood but not as a mere colouring. For
Heidegger, mood is primordial, and it is the means by which
we make sense of the things we disclose. It is the ground
against which things (figures) are disclosed. ‘‘Moods are
Heidegger’s favourite example of a response to what mat-
ters in a situation, at least in part because they are so per-
vasive, intrusive and uninvited. A mood makes manifest not
only (1) how things are going (here and now), but also (2)
the way in which this matters, and (3) the extent to which it
just has to be accepted’’, Downing (2000, pp. 245).
Together Befindlichkeit and Stimmung attune or orien-
tate us to the world and are responsible for making it
known it to us. Thus, we ‘‘know’’ and make sense of the
world, and all it comprises through these affective
faculties.
From this discussion, what emerges is an ontological
treatment of affect which bears a number of important
similarities to empirical, psychological accounts. For
example, Schachter and Singer (2001) write that, ‘‘The
emotional response is hypothesised to prepare and mobilise
the person to cope with the particular appraised harm or
benefit in an adaptive manner …’’ (p. 95). They also
describe, ‘‘appraisal is an evaluation of what one’s rela-
tionship to the environment implies for personal well
being’’. Oatley and Johnson-Laird (1987) similarly regard
affect as primarily being a means of communication, in that
our emotions guide our actions in situations of bounded
rationality (in situations of imperfect knowledge and mul-
tiple conflicting goals). Our emotions offer this guidance
by making available a repertoire of actions which have
been previously useful in similar situations, thus emotions
effectively guide our actions and decision-making (con-
sciously and unconsciously).
Oatley (1992) also tells us, ‘‘Each goal and plan has a
monitoring mechanism that evaluates events relevant to it.
When a substantial change of probability occurs of
achieving an important goal or subgoal, the monitoring
mechanism broadcasts to the whole cognitive system a
signal that can set it into readiness to respond to this
change. Humans experience these signals and the states of
readiness they induce as emotions.’’ (p. 50). These emo-
tions signal success, failure, frustration and disgust. Oatley
and Johnson-Laird equate achieving a subgoals with hap-
piness; the failure of a major plan with sadness; and the
frustration of an active plan with anger.
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This emotional guidance also signals our degree of
involvement. Being happy is likely to signal a significant
degree of involvement–engagement while sadness may
equally witness the un-involvement and the abandonment
of the technology in favour of other involvements.
In conclusion, while it would be unwise to suggest that
Heidegger’s treatment of affect relies on the exact same
neurological mechanisms as the proposed appraisal
accounts of affect they do appear to be congruent in
function.
So far, this account of involvement–engagement has
dealt with acting on the invitation of affordances, the
broader context of these invitations and responses and how
we monitor and make sense of them. This leaves the role of
the body to consider.
4.4 The involved body
The use of the current generation of games consoles such
as the Microsoft KinectTM has highlighted the centrality of
our bodies in their use but in doing so raises problems for
an account of involvement–engagement based on Heideg-
ger’s work. The reason for this is that as he scarcely
mentions, much less discusses the body, writing, ‘‘this
‘bodily nature’ hides a whole problematic of its own,
though we shall not treat it here’’ (page 143). Despite this,
he actually did not remain silent on the matter. Aho (2009,
p. 14) quotes Heidegger as follows, ‘‘We do not ‘have’ a
body in the way we carry a knife in a sheath. Neither is the
body a natural body that merely accompanies us and which
we can establish, expressly or not, as being also ‘‘at hand’’.
We do not ‘‘have’’ a body; rather, we ‘‘are’’ bodily … Our
being embodied is essentially other than merely being
encumbered with an organism. Most of what we know
from the natural sciences about the body and the way it
embodies are specifications based on the established mis-
interpretation of the body as a mere natural body’’. So,
Heidegger does distinguish between a ‘‘mere natural body’’
and embodiment which is less a discussion of how far we
can stretch our arms or the acuity of our eyes but is more a
consideration of readiness-to-hand and availability.
As for the natural body, psychology, for example, typ-
ically has tended to treat it as the means by which (sensory)
data enter the brain. This is also largely true of telepresence
research where the body has, until quite recently, been
treated as an ‘‘engineering problem’’ (Sheridan 1992).
In contrast, Heidegger identifies embodiment as a
characteristic of Dasein that is prior to the notion of a
natural body but as counter-intuitive as this might seem it is
not to suggest that embodiment is somehow metaphysical
or ‘‘ghostly’’, indeed the reverse is true. This conceptuali-
sation of embodiment is more actually more situated and
concrete than the corresponding ergonomic or psycholog-
ical treatments.
This all being said, Heidegger does not expand on what
he means by embodiment which rather leaves the matter
open and to illuminate this we turn to the cognitive science
literature.
Recently, Shapiro (2011) identified three major accounts
of embodiment as reflected in the work of Valera and his
colleagues; here, embodiment is seen as World Building;
while Thelen and her work on dynamic systems theory can
be characterised as Representation Lite, and finally, Clark’s
treatment of embodiment Shapiro describes as Thinking
with the Body. All three perspectives are primarily con-
cerned with the consequences of embodiment for cogni-
tion. Here, cognition is used in a broad sense, that is,
cognition is what we use to cope with the world.
Valera rejects the traditional view of cognition as
‘‘rules’’ being applied to ‘‘representations’’ and instead
treats cognition as a form of action—embodied action. By
embodied, he means that cognition itself depends upon the
kinds of experiences which can only come from a body
with (our) specific capacities. These capacities are vari-
ously biological, psychological, social and cultural. So, the
fact of our embodiment defines us.
Thelen and her colleagues also reject traditional
accounts and treat cognition as a consequence of our
embodiment. Like Valera, Thelen regards cognition as
arising as a consequence of our interaction with the world
and ‘‘from having a body with particular perceptual and
motor capabilities that are inseparably linked and that
together form a matrix within which reasoning, memory,
emotion, language and all other aspects of mental life are
linked’’. Her evidence for this position has drawn heavily
on developmental studies.
Clark’s treatment of embodiment is rather more com-
plex and perhaps more ambitious. Clark has woven toge-
ther Gibsonian ecological thinking; self-structuring
information; and perception as sensorimotor experience.
The body then becomes part of an overall system which
like the brain contributes to cognition.
In reviewing, these different approaches and their rele-
vance to this discussion on embodiment, it is fair to say that
none of them offer a particularly good match, but each has
a contribution to make. This conclusion is echoed by
Chemero (2011), in his Radical Embodied Cognitive Sci-
ence, who has questioned the need for there being only one
clear agreed account of embodiment, arguing that specific
accounts are better able to explain specific behaviours.
Thus, to place embodiment within an account of involve-
ment–engagement is to recognise that it serves as the basis
of involvement–engagement itself (‘‘world building’’) is
dynamic and contingent (‘‘arises from bodily interactions
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with the world’’) and is epistemic (‘‘can be called to off-
load computation’’).
One final note on this topic. The neuroscientist Antonio
Damasio has developed an interesting hypothesis in plac-
ing emotions in the body as part of his somatic marker
hypothesis (SMH). Damasio (1994) writes, ‘‘somatic
makers are a special instance of feelings generated from
secondary emotions. Those emotions and feelings have
been connected, by learning, to predict future outcomes of
certain scenarios’’. And, ‘‘Somatic markers do not delib-
erate for us. They assist the deliberation by highlighting
(either dangerous or favourable) and eliminating them
rapidly from subsequent consideration’’. These somatic
markers are learned so that when we think of a possible
decision which has had a negative outcome for us in the
past it is experienced as ‘‘an unpleasant gut feeling’’. Thus,
automatically and based on what he describes as ‘‘condi-
tioned avoidance’’, we tend not to make decisions leading
to this kind of unpleasant event. Conversely, we tend to be
attracted to events (and actions) that are associated with
reward. If Damasio is correct, this may neatly tie together
embodiment, affect and involvement–engagement (while
perhaps offering a fourth theme to the discussion of
embodiment).
5 Discussion
This paper began by highlighting examples of the very
many forms of technologically driven engagement which
have appeared in literature. It was argued that as engage-
ment appears in so many different forms, that the creation
of a definition based and reflecting this open-ended list of
attributes and tropes would be impractical. The psycho-
logical treatment of engagement also offers a similar het-
erogeneity, speaking of absorption, flow, attention and so
forth.
Faced with these difficulties, a principled position has
been adopted drawing upon the work of Heidegger. In
adopting Heidegger’s account of being it follows that
involvement with technology is the inevitable consequence
of being-in-the-world. We encounter technology as avail-
able, inviting us to exploit its in-order-to’s (affordances) to
achieve our ends whether they are purposive, fun-filled,
serious or just plain silly. This is the detail of our purposive
behaviour which itself reflects our roles and identities (for-
the-sake-of-which’s and so forth). We make sense of these
encounters with technology by way of our emotions which
offer an ‘‘appraisal’’ of the situation. So, for example, our
emotions signal as to whether we are having fun, finding
something pleasurable, or experiencing a sense of
achievement. Thus, our involvement with technology is not
a single isolated state or states experienced sequentially but
better thought of as a figure against a background of all
other involvements (i.e. we are involved–engaged with this
particular technology because we are ultimately involved–
engaged with all technology).
Having presented an account of the structure of
involvement–engagement from a largely ontological per-
spectives (with a few forays into the psychological), it is
worth considering the evidence for it in the real world. It is,
of course, easy to point to the global sales and use of
mobile phones and computer games, but these statistics
might equally be attributable to effective sales techniques
or the vagaries of fashion. Similarly, it might be unwise to
attribute the use and, arguably, overuse of social media to
involvement–engagement as there is increasing evidence of
addiction to such sites. A more reliable measure of
involvement–engagement might be evidenced in the
appropriation of technology.
5.1 Appropriation
Appropriation is the re-purposing, reconfiguring, rework-
ing, personalisation, customisation and ensoulment of
technology (e.g. Blom and Monk 2003; Dix 2007; Sal-
ovaara 2008 among many others): these acts of appropri-
ation have also found form in the growing interest in design
for serendipity (e.g. Newman et al. 2002) and design for
sustainability (e.g. Blevis 2007). Further evidence of
involvement–engagement can be found in the long tradi-
tion of user-tailorable systems (for an early example of this
please see MacLean et al. 1990) and in the appearance of
‘‘do-it-yourself’’ design (e.g. Akah and Bardzell 2010) and
designing for hackability (e.g. Galloway et al. 2004).
Immediately, we have evidence of our entanglement with
technology and of being ‘‘rolled-up’’ in it (vide the
etymological note at the end of the introduction). Let us
consider for a moment ensoulment which is a distinct and
striking form of appropriation. Nelson and Stolterman
(2003) describe ensoulment as a mechanism to ‘‘promote
an aesthetic of well-loved designs in which the meaning
and value of a design is taken in as a feeling of being
deeply moved and as a consequence, a feeling of being
significantly changed’’. Thus, ensouled technologies are
things which are and have been cared for, looked after,
valued but also reflect the identity of their owners. Indeed,
work reported by Akah and Bardzell (2010) on the rela-
tionship between personal identity and the act of appro-
priating digital objects in the home—specifically ‘do-it-
yourself design’—to inform the design of empowering
products. Using examples from the ‘‘Steampunk’’ move-
ment, they explore personal appropriation and the do-
it-yourself approach to design and sense of self. For
ensoulment to occur, the everyday designer must be open
to interpretation as to the purpose, function, and interaction
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of the digital artefact. Thus, appropriation is about
designing (re-designing) artefacts that are adaptable to
the user, empowering and reflecting the user’s identity.
Consequently, Akah and Bardzell have redefined appro-
priation to refer to the act of adapting an artefact to oneself
in a way that not only redefines the artefact, but also relates
the artefact to one’s sense of self.
This above (brief) review of appropriation offers a
measure of empirical evidence of a number of the key
themes identified as being central to involvement–
engagement, but we conclude with the observation that
involvement–engagement with technology precedes any
act of interaction with it.
5.2 In conclusion
In the course of researching, this essay it has emerged that
involvement–engagement must precede interaction rather
than the more expected reverse.
Evidence for this is readily witnessed, for example,
travelling home by train one is surrounded by people
reaching for their mobile phones, followed by intense
peering at them for a few seconds, and then returning them
to their pockets or handbags. Everyone doing this was
involved–engaged with the technology in-order-to check
for texts, emails, alerts and messages of all kinds. Of
course, most people do not receive an unending stream of
messages and find themselves returning their phones to
pockets (or whatever) without interacting with them. To
use Edmond’s terminology, these commuters were drawn
to their phone’s attractors but found nothing to sustain
them.
Placing involvement–engagement logically before
interaction also rather demotes it in importance. Interaction
then becomes a consequence of involvement–engagement
rather than the driver for any relationship we have with
technology. Interaction is then relegated to being only
concerned with the exploitation of the technology’s in-
order-to and has little or nothing to contribute to the
broader understanding of how we use digital technology.
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